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Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Form 
of Sex-Plus Discrimination 
MARC CHASE MCALLISTER† 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines whether sexual orientation discrimination 
claims are a form of sex-plus discrimination under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits discrimination in 
employment on the basis of “sex.” Until very recently, every United 
States Court of Appeals to have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition 
of sex discrimination had determined that it does not encompass 
claims on the basis of sexual orientation. Times, and judicial 
interpretations, are changing. In April 2017, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned decades of 
precedent by holding that sexual orientation discrimination claims 
are indeed encompassed within Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination, a ruling adopted only months later by the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals. Although there is little mention of sex-
plus discrimination in these watershed cases, this Article shows 
how aspects of the sex-plus doctrine are interwoven throughout the 
majority and concurring opinions in those cases, and argues that 
sex-plus theory is a valid basis upon which to recognize sexual 
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII. 
  
 
†Marc McAllister is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Texas State 
University. His articles have been published in journals such as the Florida Law 
Review, Boston College Law Review, Washington and Lee Law Review, and 
others. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it 
unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees 
“because of . . . sex.”1 Until 2017, every United States Court 
of Appeals to have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” 
discrimination had determined that it does not encompass 
discrimination claims on the basis of sexual orientation.2 
Times, and judicial interpretations, are changing. In 
April 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”). 
 2. See, e.g., Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (affirming Eleventh Circuit binding precedent 
established in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979), that 
“[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII”); Kalich v. AT&T 
Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that “[u]nder Michigan 
law, as under Title VII, sexual orientation is not a protected classification”); 
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating 
that “Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a person’s 
sexuality”); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have 
reached the question that . . . Title VII does not prohibit harassment or 
discrimination because of sexual orientation”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Title VII makes it unlawful 
“to discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
2(a)(1), but “does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”); 
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 
2000) (declaring that “harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference 
or orientation (and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice 
under Title VII”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 
(1st Cir. 1999) (stating that as a matter of “settled law,” “Title VII does not 
proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation”); Wrightson v. Pizza 
Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “Title VII does 
not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual orientation”); 
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating 
that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals”); Blum v. 
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[d]ischarge for 
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII”). 
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hold that disparate treatment sexual orientation 
discrimination claims are indeed encompassed within Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination.3 In February 2018, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held the same.4 And just a few weeks before that, the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals declared, in a sexual harassment 
case, that Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claims 
can be brought under a “sex-plus” theory as long as the 
plaintiff can prove that the discriminatory treatment she 
suffered was at least partly based upon her gender.5 
Although the First Circuit’s opinion recognizes that sex-
plus doctrine may apply in the context of sexual orientation 
discrimination,6 there is little mention of sex-plus 
discrimination in the watershed Seventh and Second Circuit 
opinions,7 which involve claims of disparate treatment 
 
 3. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 
2017); see also Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F. 
115, 115–16 (2017) (noting that in Hively, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
became “the first federal court of appeals to declare that sexual orientation 
discrimination necessarily comprises sex discrimination under Title VII,” and 
describing Hively as “the most important legal success for LGBT rights since the 
marriage rulings”). 
 4. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 5. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[W]e 
do not believe [our prior precedent] forecloses a plaintiff in our Circuit from 
bringing sex-plus claims under Title VII where, in addition to the sex-based 
charge, the ‘plus’ factor is the plaintiff’s status as a gay or lesbian individual. . . . 
[W]e see no reason why claims where the “plus-factor” is sexual orientation would 
not be viable if the gay or lesbian plaintiff asserting the claim also demonstrates 
that he or she was discriminated at least in part because of his or her gender.”). 
 6. See id. 
 7. The only references to sex-plus discrimination in these opinions include a 
cursory dismissal of the doctrine by a dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit 
case. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(Lynch, J., dissenting) (stating that “sex-plus” discrimination claims typically 
“single out for disfavored status traits that are, for example, common to women 
but rare in men”); id. at 152 n.20 (acknowledging that “discrimination against a 
subcategory of members of one sex is also prohibited by Title VII,” and stating 
that “[a]n employer that hires gay men but refuses to hire lesbians, or vice versa, 
would thus be in violation of the statute”). 
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(intentional) discrimination.8 Nevertheless, this Article 
shows how aspects of the sex-plus doctrine are woven 
throughout the Seventh and Second Circuit opinions. From 
there, this Article argues that Title VII sexual orientation 
discrimination claims are in fact cognizable under the sex-
plus doctrine, and contends that as other courts and litigants 
revisit whether Title VII applies to such claims, including the 
United States Supreme Court,9 they should phrase the issue 
in sex-plus terms.10 As a wise Notre Dame Law Professor, 
Professor G. Robert Blakey, once instructed me: if you can 
determine how a legal issue is phrased, you can almost 
assuredly win the debate.11 That advice rings true when 
phrasing a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claim 
as a sex-plus issue. 
To briefly explain the argument, discrimination claims 
usually involve an employer treating an employee in a 
particular protected class differently than those outside the 
employee’s protected class, such as where an employer 
promotes male but not equally-qualified female employees,12 
or where an employer imposes different workplace 
 
 8. By way of background, employees alleging discrimination usually assert 
one of four types of claims: (1) disparate treatment, see, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988) (explaining that disparate treatment 
claims involve allegations of intentional discrimination); (2) disparate impact, 
see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (authorizing 
disparate impact claims under Title VII); (3) harassment, see, e.g., Meritor Sav. 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (authorizing sexual harassment 
claims under Title VII); and (4) retaliation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) 
(making it unlawful under Title VII “for an employer to discriminate against any 
of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed” 
discriminatory actions prohibited by Title VII). 
 9. Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari 
to review the Second Circuit’s decision holding that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of gender discrimination under Title VII). 
 10. Cf. Soucek, supra note 3, at 115–16 (noting that the Hively ruling “will 
hopefully inspire other courts to embrace its result”). 
 11. Information about Professor Blakey can be found at the following 
webpage: https://law.nd.edu/directory/g-blakey/. 
 12. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
2019] SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 1011 
requirements on employees of different races.13 Sex-plus 
discrimination claims do not involve such categorically 
distinct treatment of an entire protected group.14 Rather, in 
sex-plus discrimination scenarios, an employer exercises a 
more specific type of sex-based animus targeting only a 
certain segment of males or females on the basis of both the 
employee’s sex and another “plus” factor, as when an 
employer treats women with children differently than men 
with children due to the employer’s stereotypical belief that 
such women, but not such men, will be unproductive or 
unreliable employees.15 At its core, then, sex-plus 
discrimination claims “are a flavor of gender discrimination 
claims” in which an employer discriminates against a 
particular segment of males or females on the basis of sex 
(e.g., female) plus another characteristic (e.g., child care 
responsibilities).16 This is precisely the case for sexual 
orientation discrimination claims. 
Take, for example, a sexual orientation discrimination 
claim brought by a lesbian employee alleging she was fired 
due to her employer’s discriminatory animus against 
homosexuals. Here, the plaintiff’s claim would not be one of 
 
 13. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Caesar’s Palace Stream Resort, No. 3-CV-09-0625, 
2013 WL 6244568 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (plaintiff, an African-American 
employee, brought successful race discrimination claim where she was fired for 
wearing her hair in braids while a white employee was not). 
 14. See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53 (declaring that “discrimination against one 
employee cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another 
employee in that same group”). 
 15. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, 
J., concurring); see also Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory “recognizes that it is 
impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less 
favorably than women with the same additional characteristic”); Chadwick v. 
WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing sex-plus 
discrimination and concluding that, under Title VII, “an employer is not free to 
assume that a woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker 
because of family responsibilities”). 
 16. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52. 
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pure gender discrimination, as the plaintiff would not argue 
that her gender alone led to her termination.17 Rather, the 
claim would be more specific, and would allege that the 
plaintiff’s gender combined with her particular sexual 
preferences are what motivated the employer’s adverse 
action.18 
In the example of a lesbian employee who is treated 
differently than her work colleagues due to her sexual 
orientation, the “plus” characteristic that matters is the fact 
of being attracted to females, as opposed to males, as it is this 
particular “plus” factor that triggers the employer’s 
discriminatory animus.19 In this context, it would be easy for 
the plaintiff to prove that males who were likewise attracted 
to females were treated more favorably, such that simply 
changing the plaintiff’s sex would eradicate the employer’s 
animus.20 In this sense, the plaintiff’s sex is “a motivating 
factor” in the employer’s decision, and Title VII requires no 
more proof than that.21 Accordingly, discrimination on the 
 
 17. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (Flaum, J., concurring) (explaining that Hively did not allege that the 
College refused to promote women more generally). 
 18. See id. (“There is no allegation . . . that the College refused to promote 
women; nor is there an allegation that it refused to promote those who associate 
with women. Rather, Ivy Tech’s alleged animus was against Professor Hively 
[based on] a combination of these two factors.” (emphasis added)). 
 19. See id. (articulating the plaintiff’s argument as follows: “Professor Hively 
argues that [in refusing to promote her] the College relied on her sex, because, 
but for her sex, she would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not 
have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was sexually attracted to 
women) [emphasis in original].”). 
 20. Cf. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52–53 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s 
argument that a lesbian plaintiff alleging sexual harassment under a sex-plus 
theory must present evidence of a comparative class of gay males who were not 
discriminated against). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.”). 
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basis of sex has necessarily occurred.22 The fact that the 
plaintiff’s sexual preference is also a motivating factor does 
not change the outcome; it simply makes the sex 
discrimination claim a sex-plus claim, given that it is the 
plaintiff’s sex combined with her specific sexual preference 
that triggers the employer’s discriminatory animus.23 
Accordingly, sex-plus discrimination is a strong foundation 
upon which to base claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the primary theories 
and rationales applied by courts when validating sex 
discrimination claims. Part II then examines the sex-plus 
discrimination doctrine in detail, and provides examples 
where the doctrine has been applied. Part III summarizes 
federal appellate court opinions, mostly from an earlier era 
of jurisprudence, refusing to extend Title VII’s protections to 
sexual orientation discrimination claims. Part IV details the 
Second and Seventh Circuit cases extending Title VII to 
sexual orientation discrimination claims, and demonstrates 
how the key rationales set forth in these cases mirror sex-
plus discrimination doctrine. Finally, Part V argues that sex-
plus theory is a valid basis upon which to recognize Title VII 
claims of sexual orientation discrimination. Part VI 
concludes. 
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION THEORIES AND RATIONALES 
Employment discrimination statutes prohibit employers 
from discriminating against employees or job applicants due 
to certain protected characteristics, such as a person’s race 
 
 22. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (majority opinion) (“Hively alleges that if she 
had been a man married to a woman . . . and everything else had stayed the 
same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her and would not have fired 
her. . . . This describes paradigmatic sex discrimination. . . . Ivy Tech is 
disadvantaging her because she is a woman.”). 
 23. See discussion infra Part V. 
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or sex.24 Regardless of the protected characteristic at issue, 
victims of employment discrimination usually pursue one of 
four types of claims: disparate treatment,25 disparate 
impact,26 harassment,27 or retaliation.28 Although all four 
types of claims are generally available across the federal 
anti-discrimination statutes, plaintiffs alleging 
discrimination usually advance claims of disparate 
treatment, which require proof of intentional discrimination, 
 
 24. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (making it unlawful to discriminate against employees on 
the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for an 
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin”); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of disability). Other significant federal statutes include the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) 
(2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information); the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), Pub. L. No. 
93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)) (prohibiting 
discrimination against federal government employees based on disabilities). 
 25. E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988). 
 26. E.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (authorizing 
disparate impact claims under the ADEA); see also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 
U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (authorizing disparate impact claims under Title VII). 
 27. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) 
(authorizing sexual harassment claims under Title VII); Rickard v. Swedish 
Match N. Am., Inc., 773 F.3d 181, 184–85 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing workplace 
harassment claims based on either sex or age). 
 28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) (making it unlawful under Title VII 
“for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) (making it unlawful 
under the ADEA “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees 
or applicants for employment . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any 
practice made unlawful by [the ADEA], or because such individual . . . has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter”). 
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or claims of disparate impact, which do not.29 This Article 
focuses primarily on disparate treatment claims. 
The most comprehensive federal statute governing 
employment discrimination is Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for employers to 
discriminate on the basis of “sex.”30 The most obvious 
instance of sex discrimination is when an employer favors 
men over women, or vice versa,31 as when an employer 
chooses not to hire women or men for a particular job.32 Title 
VII encompasses more than such obvious instances of sex 
discrimination, however, including for example, claims based 
on sexual harassment in the workplace.33 
Although the following list is not intended to be 
exhaustive, there are at least four major rationales advanced 
by courts when recognizing more subtle forms of sex 
discrimination under Title VII. The most overarching 
rationale is equal employment opportunity, which “requires 
that persons of like qualifications be given employment 
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a rationale that has 
been invoked to strike down separate hiring policies for men 
and women that deny employment opportunities to one 
gender.34 A second rationale is based on the relatively 
 
 29. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986–87. 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 31. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 32. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 
2017). 
 33. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986). 
 34. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that 
Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment 
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one 
hiring policy for women and another for men”); see also Int’l Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 
499 U.S. 187, 199–200 (1991) (striking down employer’s policy barring fertile 
women, but not fertile men, from jobs entailing high levels of lead exposure, and 
declaring that such an “explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under 
[Title VII]”). 
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unequal burdens sometimes imposed upon the sexes. Under 
this rationale, unlawful sex discrimination occurs when an 
employer imposes unreasonably unequal burdens on males 
and females in similar positions, such as when an employer 
disciplines female, but not male, employees based on their 
weight.35 A third theory is sex stereotyping. Under this 
framework, unlawful sex discrimination would occur when 
an employer takes action against an employee based on the 
employee’s failure to conform to the employer’s stereotyped 
characterization of the sexes, as where a female employee is 
denied a promotion because she does not meet the employer’s 
expectation of how a female should behave in the 
workplace.36 Somewhat differently, sex stereotyping might 
occur when an employer takes an adverse action against a 
male or female based on the employer’s stereotypical 
assumption of how such a person would likely behave in the 
workplace; this particular type of sex stereotyping would 
occur, for example, if an employer refuses to hire women with 
children, but not men with children, on the belief that such 
women would inevitably be bad employees.37 Yet another 
 
 35. Compare Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(striking down a weight policy under which women were forced to meet the 
requirements of a medium body frame standard while men were required to meet 
the more generous requirements of a large body frame standard because the 
policy did not impose equal burdens on the sexes, but instead categorically 
“applie[d] less favorably to one gender”), with Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating 
Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (rejecting Title VII claim of 
sex discrimination based on a policy under which female bartenders were 
required to wear makeup while male bartenders were prohibited from doing so, 
and finding that minor differences in appearance requirements do not impose 
unreasonably unequal burdens on either males or females). 
 36. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (adopting the 
sex stereotyping theory and stating that “we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group”). 
 37. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45–48 (1st Cir. 2009); 
see also Zachary R. Herz, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for 
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 405 (2014) (describing the employer’s 
application of such stereotypical assumptions in Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)). 
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rationale underlying certain claims of sex discrimination, 
one that is the focus of this Article, is sex-plus 
discrimination. 
II. SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION 
Under the sex-plus discrimination doctrine, a plaintiff, 
often female, may bring a Title VII claim for sex 
discrimination if she can show that her employer 
discriminated against her not because of her gender per se, 
but because of the combination of her gender plus some 
additional factor, such as having young children.38 As courts 
have developed the doctrine, the additional “plus” factor in a 
sex-plus case must pertain either to an immutable 
characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right.39 This 
section examines these two types of sex-plus discrimination 
claims, and section V shows how each of these types of sex-
plus claims are applicable in cases involving sexual 
orientation discrimination. 
A. Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving a 
Fundamental Right 
The United States Supreme Court first ratified the 
notion that Title VII could be violated by an employer’s 
discriminatory treatment of a subclass of women in Phillips 
v. Martin Marietta Corp.40 In Phillips, the Court declared 
that sex discrimination may occur through a policy of 
refusing to employ women, but not men, with pre-school aged 
 
 38. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(recognizing that in sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether 
the employer took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an 
employee’s sex,” and applying the sex-plus theory to plaintiffs who were allegedly 
discriminated against at least in part because of their gender where the “plus-
factor” is sexual orientation). 
 39. Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 
1980); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 40. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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children.41 As the Phillips Court explained, Title VII 
“requires that persons of like qualifications be given 
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a 
principle violated by the employer’s gender-based hiring 
policies.42 Importantly, Phillips established that when an 
employer discriminates against a particular subgroup of 
women, such as women with children, the employer may not 
defend its actions with evidence that it does not discriminate 
against women on the whole.43 The Court thus deemed it 
irrelevant that at least 75 percent of the persons hired for the 
position at issue in that case were women (albeit those 
without children), given that discrimination had occurred 
against a more specific subgroup of females—i.e., those with 
young children.44 
In a more recent example where the “plus” factor in a 
sex-plus claim involved the exercise of a fundamental right, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered a 
discrimination claim brought by school psychologist, Elana 
Back, after she was denied tenure due to an alleged 
stereotypical view that young mothers could not balance both 
work and home obligations.45 Treating the case as one of sex 
stereotyping against the particular segment of women with 
children, the court noted that, as in Phillips, “discrimination 
against one employee cannot be cured . . . solely by 
favorable . . . treatment of other employees of the 
 
 41. Id. at 544. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 543–44 (finding that a policy of refusing to hire women with pre-
school age children discriminates on the basis of sex even though at least 75% of 
those hired for the position were women). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 115 
(2d Cir. 2004) (describing the alleged stereotyping behavior). Notably, Back 
brought her sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which 
the court found to encompass sex-plus claims. Id. at 118–19. 
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same . . . sex,”46 as the question is whether Back herself was 
discriminated against under Title VII on the basis of her 
sex.47 Accordingly, the court rejected the employer’s 
argument that it was immune from Back’s allegations of 
gender discrimination simply because 85% of the school’s 
teachers were women, and 71% of these women had 
children.48 Rather, “what matters is how Back was 
treated.”49 And on this point, the court found evidence that 
the decision makers who denied Back tenure had stereotyped 
her “as a woman and mother of young children, and thus 
treated her differently than they would have treated a man 
and father of young children.”50 Such evidence, according to 
the court, was enough for Back’s discrimination claim to 
survive summary judgment.51 
In another case involving a sex-plus discrimination claim 
with a “plus” characteristic involving a fundamental right, 
McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a 
teacher could maintain a Title VII sex discrimination claim 
as a member of a subclass of women with disabled children.52 
There, the court found evidence of discriminatory animus 
against mothers with disabled children, including direct 
 
 46. Id. at 121 (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 47. Id. at 122. This point was later reiterated by the United States Supreme 
Court. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (1982) (stating that the 
purpose of Title VII “is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the 
protection of the minority group as a whole,” and explaining that in enacting Title 
VII, “Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against 
some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats 
other members of the employees’ group”). 
 48. Back, 365 F.3d at 122. 
 49. Id. at 122. 
 50. Id. at 130; see also id. at 124 (analyzing the evidence of discriminatory 
motives and comments of plaintiff’s supervisors, Brennan and Wishnie). 
 51. Id. at 130. Notably, summary judgment was denied only against the 
actual decision makers in Back’s case. See id. 
 52. 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
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evidence of discriminatory animus by the school’s principal.53 
The court thus rejected the defendant’s argument that it 
could not be liable for sex discrimination given that the 
person ultimately hired for the position was also a woman, 
reasoning that the person hired was “not a member of the 
subclass of women with disabled children” to which plaintiff 
belonged.54 
Phillips, Back, and McGrenaghan are examples of sex-
plus discrimination claims brought by female employees 
treated differently for having children.55 Courts have 
recognized similar subclasses of women based on their 
exercise of other fundamental rights.56 Courts have found, 
for example, that an employer’s unfavorable treatment of 
married women, as compared to married men, violates Title 
VII.57 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on 
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. Id. 
 55. See also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(denying summary judgment to defendant-employer on similar sex-plus 
discrimination claim); Philipsen v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-
11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (recognizing a 
similar claim, but granting summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff’s 
“sex plus” claim due to a lack of evidence that plaintiff was treated differently 
than males with young children). 
 56. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033. 
 57. See, e.g., Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 
1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus marital status claim, ruling that a female 
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were 
treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for plaintiff due to a lack of 
evidence on that point); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 
(7th Cir. 1971) (finding employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate 
Title VII); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 888 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2004) (recognizing a sex-plus claim on the basis of sex-plus marital and 
family status, but ultimately dismissing plaintiff’s claim because she failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the issue of pretext); Rauw v. 
Glickman, No. CV–99–1482–ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001) 
(authorizing a sex-plus marital status claim under Title VII); Jurinko v. Wiegand 
Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (refusal to hire married women 
violated Title VII). 
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In the sex-plus marital status cases, as in Phillips, Back, 
and McGrenaghan, courts have rejected employer arguments 
that no discrimination occurred “on the basis of sex” because 
the employer did not discriminate against women as a 
whole.58 In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit noted that an employer’s no-marriage 
rule, which it applied to female flight stewardesses but not 
their male counterparts, violated Title VII even though the 
rule did not apply to all female employees, “for so long as sex 
is a factor in the application of the rule, such application 
involves a discrimination based on sex.”59 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit declared, Title VII’s effect “is not to be diluted 
because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the 
protected class.”60 As another court in a similar case 
declared, “[i]f [a] company discriminates against married 
women, but not against married men, the variable[s] 
become[] [men and] women, and the discrimination, based on 
solely sexual distinctions, invidious and unlawful.”61 
B. Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving Immutable 
Characteristics 
As noted, the sex-plus theory applies when an employer 
discriminates against a particular subclass of males or 
females based on the exercise of a fundamental right, such 
as the right to marry or have children;62 or an immutable 
characteristic, such as the plaintiff’s race.63 
 
 58. Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the argument). 
 59. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (adopting the reasoning of the EEOC, as 
expressed in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187. 
 62. See supra Part II.A. 
 63. See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Nicole 
Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women 
Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 87 (2003). 
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Immutable characteristics are simply those the 
employee cannot change.64 In the past 50 years, courts have 
recognized various Title VII “plus claims” involving a 
combination of immutable characteristics. Exemplary claims 
include those based on sex-plus-race (e.g., alleging 
discrimination against black females65 or against Asian 
females66), race-plus-religion (e.g., alleging discrimination 
against a white Jewish male67), and sex-plus-age (e.g., 
involving discrimination against older women68). This 
section summarizes a few leading cases. 
In one case alleging discrimination on the basis of sex-
plus-race, Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action 
Association, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit recognized a subclass of black women for purposes of 
Title VII discrimination analysis.69 In that case, plaintiff 
Dafro Jefferies, a black female, alleged that her employer 
discriminated against her due to her race and sex.70 The 
district court separated Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race claim 
into distinct claims of race discrimination and sex 
 
 64. David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 378 (2016) (citing 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
 65. See e.g., Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (recognizing a subclass of black women 
or a sex-plus-race claim). 
 66. See e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(recognizing a subclass of Asian women or a sex-plus-race claim). 
 67. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding 
sufficient evidence “to support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on 
the basis of his religion and/or race”). 
 68. See, e.g., Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. C/A3:08-4132-JFAPJG, 
2010 WL 1052082, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010). 
 69. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 70. Id. at 1028. In her complaint, Jefferies charged that HCCAA 
discriminated against her in promotion “because she is a woman, up in age and 
because she is Black.” Id. at 1029. Jefferies’ age-based discrimination claim, 
however, did not materialize as a live issue at trial, and was not before the court 
on appeal. Id. at 1030. 
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discrimination.71 This, in turn, allowed the district court to 
reject Jefferies’ race discrimination claim based on evidence 
that the promotion she sought was instead filled by a black 
male.72 The district court then rejected Jefferies’ sex 
discrimination claim due to evidence that 60–70 percent of 
the defendant’s employees were female, who often held 
important positions within the organization.73 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the 
district court’s decision for having improperly separated 
Jefferies’ plus discrimination claim into distinct race and sex 
discrimination claims.74 The court reasoned that 
discrimination against black females can exist even in the 
absence of discrimination against black men or white 
women.75 Describing “black females as a distinct protected 
subgroup,” the court concluded that “when a Title VII 
plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against 
black females, the fact that black males and white females 
are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant,”76 particularly 
when invoked to disprove discrimination in the case at hand, 
as black men and white women must be treated as persons 
outside the subclass of black females.77 
 
 71. Id. at 1032 (explaining that the district court did not analyze whether the 
plaintiff was discriminated against “based on a combination of race and sex,” and 
instead “separately addressed Jefferies’ claims of race discrimination and sex 
discrimination”). 
 72. See id. at 1028, 1030 (rejecting Jefferies’ claim of pure race discrimination 
in promotion, given that the person promoted to the position at issue was also 
black). 
 73. Id. at 1029–31. 
 74. Id. at 1032. 
 75. Id. at 1034. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 1032; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of color are frequently 
the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend not to be 
represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”). 
1024 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
Since Jefferies, numerous courts have ratified sex-plus 
claims by subclasses of employees in similar circumstances.78 
In one case, Lam v. University of Hawai’i, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized a Title VII 
sex-plus-race discrimination claim brought by an Asian 
woman of Vietnamese descent.79 In that case, Maivan Clech 
Lam filed a lawsuit claiming the University of Hawai’i’s Law 
School discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex, 
and national origin, when it twice rejected her application for 
a faculty position.80 After losing at trial, Lam appealed.81 
Examining the initial rejection of Lam’s application, and 
focusing specifically on Lam’s allegations of race and sex 
discrimination, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared 
that, “[o]n summary judgment, the existence of a 
discriminatory motive for the employment decision will 
 
 78. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir. 
1987) (adopting the reasoning of Jefferies in recognizing a sex-plus-race hostile 
work environment claim); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV-
01861 (VLB), 2017 WL 326317, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that 
“[a] plaintiff may bring a [discrimination] claim under a combination of two 
protected grounds of Title VII, such as race and gender”); Walton v. Vilsack, No. 
CIV.A. 09-7627, 2011 WL 3489967, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2011) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that a plaintiff cannot present evidence of discrimination 
against her as an African-American female); Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 3:03–
3445–MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (in a lengthy 
discussion of the issue, recognizing a combination claim alleging race plus sex 
discrimination under Title VII); Nieto v. Kapoor, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1140 
(D.N.M. 2000) (considering evidence of harassment based on both race and their 
sex); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d 
sub nom. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(treating plaintiff’s race and gender discrimination claims as involving “the class 
of black women”); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 
1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black woman is protected against 
discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an employer who 
singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat plaintiff’s 
case by showing that white females or black males are not so unfavorably 
treated.”). 
 79. 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n.16, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 80. Id. at 1554, 1558. 
 81. Id. at 1558. 
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generally be the principal question.”82 And on that issue, 
Lam presented testimony that the Chair of the appointments 
committee, Professor A., had a biased attitude towards 
women and Asians.83 According to the Ninth Circuit, this 
evidence was sufficient to preclude summary judgment for 
the defendants.84 
As in Jefferies, the Ninth Circuit in Lam found it 
erroneous for the district court to have relied on the 
defendants’ favorable treatment of two other candidates for 
the faculty position at issue: one an Asian man (tending to 
defeat a claim of pure race discrimination), and the other a 
white woman (tending to defeat a claim of pure sex 
discrimination).85 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district 
court apparently viewed racism and sexism as “distinct 
elements amenable to almost mathematical treatment, so 
that evaluating discrimination against an Asian woman 
became a simple matter of performing two separate tasks: 
looking for racism ‘alone’ and looking for sexism ‘alone,’ with 
Asian men and white women as the corresponding model 
victims.”86 This slicing and dicing of Lam’s plus-
discrimination claim, according to the Ninth Circuit, failed 
to account for the fact that “Asian women are subject to a set 
of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men 
nor by white women,”87 such that Asian women may be 
targeted for discrimination “even in the absence of 
 
 82. Id. at 1559. 
 83. Id. at 1560. 
 84. Id. In reaching this result, the court also noted that Lam had presented 
evidence that another professor who participated in the hiring process had stated 
that the new hire should be male. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1561. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1562. Here, the court noted in a footnote that Asian women are 
subject to particular stereotypes such as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, and 
lotus blossom. Id. at 1562 n.21. 
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discrimination against [Asian] men or white women.”88 
Accordingly, the court determined that “when a plaintiff is 
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine 
whether the employer discriminates on the basis of that 
combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates 
against people of the same race or of the same sex.”89 
C. Plus Factors Not Involving a Fundamental Right or 
Immutable Characteristic 
The sex-plus theory of discrimination is not without 
limitation.90 For example, courts have rejected sex-plus 
discrimination claims in the context of gender differentiated 
appearance requirements, such as employer policies 
imposing different makeup or hair length requirements for 
men and women.91 This is because, unlike valid sex-plus 
claims, the “plus” factors in these cases do not involve an 
immutable characteristic such as race or national origin, or 
a constitutionally protected fundamental right such as 
marriage or child rearing.92 
In limiting sex-plus discrimination claims in this 
manner, courts have highlighted Title VII’s objective of 
ensuring equal job opportunity for males and females based 
on their qualifications, rather than their sex.93 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has explained that 
“[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured only when 
employers are barred from discriminating against employees 
 
 88. Id. at 1562 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 
1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 89. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 90. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033–34. 
 91. See, e.g., Knott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1250–52 (8th Cir. 
1975) (rejecting sex-plus discrimination under Title VII based on minor 
differences resulting from hair length limitations for male employees but not for 
female employees). 
 92. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033. 
 93. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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on the basis of immutable characteristics . . . [or] some 
fundamental right.”94 “But a hiring policy that distinguishes 
on some other ground, such as grooming codes or length of 
hair, is related more closely to the employer’s choice of how 
to run his business than to equality of employment 
opportunity.”95 
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied these principles to a 
male job applicant’s sex-plus discrimination claim based on 
an employer’s differing hair length requirements for men 
and women.96 The court first found that because hair length 
can be easily changed, it is not an immutable 
characteristic.97 Likewise, the court noted, hair length is 
unlike having pre-school age children, which is “an existing 
condition not subject to change.”98 Accordingly, the court 
declared, “[i]f [an] employee objects to [such a] grooming code 
he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for 
employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate 
his preference by accepting the code along with the job.”99 
Other courts agree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. As 
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
explained, different grooming and appearance standards for 
men and women, such as different hair length requirements, 
are merely “classifications by sex which do not limit 
employment opportunities by making distinctions based on 
immutable personal characteristics, which do not represent 
any attempt by the employer to prevent the employment of a 
particular sex, and which do not pose distinct employment 
 
 94. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1086. 
 97. Id. at 1091 (“Hair length is not immutable and in the situation of employer 
vis à vis employee enjoys no constitutional protection.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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disadvantages for one sex.”100 Accordingly, the sex-plus 
discrimination doctrine may not be used to challenge such 
classifications.101 
III. COURTS REJECTING TITLE VII SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Before 2017, essentially every federal appellate court 
had rejected the argument that Title VII permits claims of 
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of “sex” 
discrimination.102 Nevertheless, nearly two dozen state 
legislatures have now included “sexual orientation” as a 
distinct protected characteristic under their own state anti-
discrimination statutes, effectively making the employment 
rights of gays and lesbians dependent on the state in which 
the person lives and works.103 Additionally, in 2015, the 
 
 100. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 101. Id. at 1337. 
 102. See supra note 2. 
 103. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2019) (generally prohibiting 
employment discrimination on the basis of “race, religious creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic 
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, 
sexual orientation, or military and veteran status”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-
402(1)(a) (2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate on 
the basis of “sexual orientation,” among other things); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-
81c (2019) (generally prohibiting discrimination in employment “because of [an] 
individual’s sexual orientation or civil union status”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, 
§ 711(a)(1) (2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sexual orientation, 
gender identity,” or other protected characteristics); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 
(2019) (generally prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “race, 
sex including gender identity or expression, sexual orientation,” and other 
protected characteristics); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (2019) (stating a public 
policy of securing freedom from discrimination because of, among other things, 
“sexual orientation”); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2019) (making it generally unlawful to 
discriminate against applicants for employment or employees because of, among 
other things, the individual’s “sexual orientation” or “gender identity”); ME. STAT. 
tit. 5, § 4571 (2019) (recognizing as a civil right “[t]he opportunity for an 
individual to secure employment without discrimination because of . . . sexual 
orientation”); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606(a)(1) (West 2019) (making it 
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
determined that “allegations of discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of 
discrimination on the basis of sex” under Title VII.104 
Applying a sex stereotyping analysis, the EEOC based its 
ruling in part on the notion that a person claiming sexual 
orientation discrimination often fails to live up to the 
employer’s “fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or 
expectation that individuals should be attracted only to those 
of the opposite sex.”105 
Although not binding on courts, the EEOC’s ruling 
prompted courts to re-examine whether Title VII permits 
claims of sexual orientation discrimination as an instance of 
sex discrimination.106 In 2017, a three-judge panel of the 
 
generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of, among other 
things, “sexual orientation” or “gender identity”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4 
(2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an 
individual “because of” the person’s “sexual orientation” or “gender identity,” 
among other protected characteristics); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2019) (making it 
“an unfair employment practice for an employer” to discriminate against an 
individual because of her “sexual orientation,” among other protected 
characteristics); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2019) (making it unlawful “[t]o fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any person, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any person with respect to the person’s compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of employment, because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or expression, age, disability or national origin”); see 
also State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last updated June 7, 2019) 
(summarizing state laws prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination, including those noted above along with laws from New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin). 
 104. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at 
*10 (July 15, 2015). 
 105. Id. (“An employee could show that the sexual orientation discrimination 
he or she experienced was sex discrimination because it involved treatment that 
would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex; because it was based on the 
sex of the person(s) the individual associates with; and/or because it was 
premised on the fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or expectation that 
individuals should be attracted only to those of the opposite sex.”). 
 106. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir. 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
revisited this issue in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.107 
This decision is significant, in that it steadfastly rejects 
sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII, 
despite the EEOC’s changed position on the issue.108 
In Evans, plaintiff Jameka Evans sued her former 
employer, Georgia Regional Hospital, alleging that she was 
discriminated against on the basis of her sex for failing to 
carry herself in a “traditional woman[ly] manner,” adding 
that although she did not openly broadcast her sexual 
orientation, it was “evident” that she identified with the male 
gender because of her “male uniform, low male haircut, 
shoes, etc.”109 Reading Evans’s complaint as presenting 
separate claims for discrimination based on sexual 
orientation (for being a gay female) and gender non-
conformity (for appearing male), a magistrate judge issued a 
report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending 
dismissal of all of Evans’s claims with prejudice.110 The 
magistrate judge reasoned that Title VII “was not intended 
to cover discrimination against homosexuals,”111 and that 
Evans’s gender non-conformity claim was “just another way 
 
2017). 
 107. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). 
 108. See id. at 1255–56; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894 
F.3d 1335, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (refusing to grant a rehearing en banc on a 
similar Title VII issue); cf. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 
2019) (declining to reach the issue of whether to overrule Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 
597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979), which held that sexual orientation discrimination 
is not unlawful under Title VII, but noting that “Blum remains binding precedent 
in this circuit to this day”). 
 109. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250. 
 110. See Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., No. CV415-103, 2015 WL 5316694, at 
*2–3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV415-
103, 2015 WL 6555440 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
remanded, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 111. Id. at *2. 
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to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation.”112 The 
district court later adopted the R&R and dismissed the case 
with prejudice.113 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Evans argued that 
the district court erred in dismissing both her gender non-
conformity and sexual orientation discrimination claims.114 
Given the procedural posture of the case, the Eleventh 
Circuit began by noting that to survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must simply contain enough factual matter that, 
accepted as true, “states a claim for relief that is plausible on 
its face.”115 The court then found that Evans’s complaint 
failed to meet this standard as to both claims.116 
Regarding her gender non-conformity claim, the court 
determined that a claim of sex discrimination based on 
gender non-conformity is indeed actionable,117 and is not 
“just another way to claim discrimination based on sexual 
orientation,” as the district court had determined.118 
Nevertheless, the court found that Evans’s complaint failed 
to plead sufficient facts to create a plausible inference that 
she suffered discrimination on this basis.119 Accordingly, the 
court remanded to permit Evans to amend that claim.120 
 
 112. Id. at *3. 
 113. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., No. CV415-103, 2015 WL 6555440, at *1 
(S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 850 F.3d 1248 
(11th Cir. 2017). 
 114. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1253–58. 
 117. Id. at 1254 (stating that “[d]iscrimination based on failure to conform to a 
gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination”). 
 118. Id. at 1254–55 (stating its holding on this issue as follows: “[w]e hold that 
the lower court erred because a gender non-conformity claim is not ‘just another 
way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but instead, constitutes 
a separate, distinct avenue for relief under Title VII.”). 
 119. Id. at 1254. 
 120. Id. at 1255. 
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More importantly, the court then affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of Evans’s sexual orientation 
discrimination claim.121 The Evans majority provided three 
primary reasons for this decision.122 First, the court felt 
restrained by Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosing such 
claims,123 which in the Eleventh Circuit must be followed 
until overruled by the court en banc or by the Supreme 
Court.124 Second, the Evans majority, as well as Judge 
William Pryor’s concurring opinion, reasoned that at the 
time of its decision (prior to Hively and Zarda), essentially 
all other federal circuits had determined that sexual 
orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title 
VII.125 As the Evans opinions pointed out, courts have 
generally rejected such claims under Title VII because 
“sexual orientation” is not itself a protected class under that 
statute.126 And in Judge Pryor’s view, Congress, rather than 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1255–57. 
 123. Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 
1979)) (“Discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”). 
 124. Id. (quoting Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251, 
1256 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
 125. See id. at 1256–57 (citing cases); id. at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 126. See id. at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring); id. at 1272 (Rosenbaum, J., 
dissenting); see also, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (stating that “sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for 
discriminatory acts under Title VII”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 
F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Title VII makes it unlawful “to 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
2(a)(1), but “does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”); 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The law is well-settled in 
this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no 
cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & 
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v. 
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that 
“[s]exual orientation is not a classification that is protected under Title VII; thus 
homosexuals are not members of a protected class under the law”); Higgins v. 
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e are 
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courts, should decide whether Title VII applies to sexual 
orientation discrimination claims.127 Finally, both the Evans 
majority and Judge Pryor’s concurring opinion rejected 
Evans’s argument that the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping 
precedent, Price Waterhouse, paves the way for sexual 
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII, reasoning 
that Price Waterhouse does not “squarely address whether 
sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title 
VII.”128 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that Title 
VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination encompasses 
employment decisions based on gender stereotypes.129 In 
that case, the plaintiff, a female senior manager in an 
accounting firm, was denied partnership in the firm because 
she was considered “too macho”; further, she was told she 
could improve her chances of partnership if she were to “take 
a course at charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”130 The Supreme Court ruled 
that such comments could support a Title VII claim of sex 
discrimination, thereby establishing that Title VII precludes 
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping—here, due to 
the employer’s belief that a female plaintiff like Hopkins 
failed to look and act like a woman should look and act.131 
 
called upon here to construe a statute as glossed by the Supreme Court, not to 
make a moral judgment—and we regard it as settled law that, as drafted and 
authoritatively construed, Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply 
because of sexual orientation.”); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 
143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “Title VII does not afford a cause of action 
for discrimination based upon sexual orientation”). 
 127. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 128. See id. at 1256 (majority opinion); id. at 1260 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 129. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989). 
 130. Id. at 235. 
 131. Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who 
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must 
not be, has acted on the basis of gender”); see also Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262 
1034 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
Judge Pryor devoted much of his concurring opinion in 
Evans to refuting the argument that discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation necessarily involves the type of 
gender stereotyping condemned by the Supreme Court in 
Price Waterhouse.132 Judge Pryor specifically addressed the 
argument asserted by the EEOC and the Evans dissent that 
“[a]ll homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to 
traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”133 This 
argument is flawed, the judge declared, because not all gay 
individuals behave the same or share the same interests.134 
Some gay individuals, for example, “may choose not to marry 
or date at all[,] or may choose a celibate lifestyle.”135 For this 
reason, although any particular gay employee may attempt 
to show “with enough factual evidence that she experienced 
sex discrimination because her behavior deviated from a 
gender stereotype held by an employer,” the court’s review of 
such a claim “would rest on behavior alone,” rather than the 
employee’s status as a gay individual.136 According to Judge 
Pryor, a gender non-conformity claim is a “behavior-based 
inquiry” under which courts consider whether an employer 
“hold[s] males and females to different standards of 
 
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (stating that the accounting firm in Price Waterhouse 
denied Hopkins’s partnership because “she had qualities that defied stereotypes 
of how women should look and act”); Herz, supra note 37, at 406–07 (describing 
Price Waterhouse). 
 132. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring) (writing separately “to 
explain the error of the argument . . . that a person who experiences 
discrimination because of sexual orientation necessarily experiences 
discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes”). 
 133. Id. (quoting EEOC Amicus Brief, at 14); see also id. at 1261 (Rosenbaum, 
J., dissenting) (“Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as Evans has, that she 
has been discriminated against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges 
that she has been discriminated against because she failed to conform to the 
employer’s image of what women should be—specifically, that women should be 
sexually attracted to men only.”). 
 134. See id. at 1259 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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behavior,” whereas a sexual orientation discrimination 
involves a “status”-based inquiry.137 As such, the claims are 
distinct, such that sexual orientation discrimination claims, 
on the whole, do not fall within the category of sex 
discrimination due to gender non-conformity.138 
Despite the EEOC’s ruling to the contrary, the Eleventh 
Circuit in Evans held firm to the notion that Title VII does 
not permit sexual orientation discrimination claims.139 The 
court further clarified that a homosexual employee wishing 
to claim discrimination under Title VII must instead claim 
sex discrimination utilizing evidence of specific gender non-
conforming behavior, as opposed to her sexual orientation 
per se.140 If this interpretation of Title VII is correct, the 
gender stereotyping theory espoused by the Supreme Court 
in Price Waterhouse cannot justify the categorical inclusion 
of sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title 
VII.141 Although this interpretation is debatable,142 
particularly in light of the Second and Seventh Circuit 
opinions summarized below, the Eleventh Circuit is not 
alone in this view.143 As such, another rationale is needed to 
 
 137. Id. at 1259–60. 
 138. See id. at 1260–61 (“We review claims of gender nonconformity the same 
way in all appeals regardless of a plaintiff’s sexual orientation. Any correlation 
that might exist between a particular sexual orientation and deviation from a 
particular gender stereotype does not overcome this settled rule.”). 
 139. See supra notes 104–05, 121-28, and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 114–128 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring) (writing separately “to 
explain the error of the argument . . . that a person who experiences 
discrimination because of sexual orientation necessarily experiences 
discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes”). 
 142. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 37, at 422–35 (arguing that Price Waterhouse 
allows courts to declare unlawful more subtle and individualized forms of sexual 
orientation discrimination). 
 143. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–65 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(articulating a similar argument that harassment based on perceived 
homosexuality is distinct from harassment based on actual and observed gender 
non-conformity). 
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connect sexual orientation discrimination to Title VII’s 
existing prohibition of “sex” discrimination.144 As the next 
section demonstrates, sex-plus theory provides the necessary 
connection. 
IV. COURTS AUTHORIZING TITLE VII SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
In April 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit became the first federal appeals court to hold 
that Title VII permits claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.145 Less than 
one year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held the same.146 This section summarizes 
the major rationales offered by these two courts, and shows 
how those rationales can be recharacterized in sex-plus 
terms. 
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Seventh Circuit case extending Title VII to claims of 
sexual orientation discrimination, Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College of Indiana, involved allegations of sexual 
orientation discrimination by an openly lesbian plaintiff, 
Kimberly Hively.147 Hively began teaching as a part-time, 
adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000.148 
Between 2009 and 2014, Hively applied for numerous full-
time positions with Ivy Tech, which repeatedly rejected her 
 
 144. This is not to suggest that Judge Pryor will necessarily have the final say 
on the gender stereotyping theory as applied to claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination. Indeed, arguments for applying the gender stereotyping theory 
in this context are quite persuasive. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262–69 
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting). 
 145. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 
2017). 
 146. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 147. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341. 
 148. Id. 
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applications.149 After the college failed to renew her part-
time contract in 2014, Hively filed an EEOC charge alleging 
that she was “being discriminated against based on [her] 
sexual orientation,” in violation of Title VII.150 Hively later 
sued Ivy Tech in federal district court, which dismissed her 
complaint on the basis that sexual orientation discrimination 
is not a protected class under Title VII.151 This decision was 
affirmed by a panel of judges on appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals,152 after which the full court voted 
to rehear the case en banc.153 
Writing for the en banc court, Chief Judge Diane Wood 
phrased the Title VII issue in the case as “whether actions 
taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset of 
actions taken on the basis of sex,”154 one she described as “a 
pure question of statutory interpretation . . . well within the 
judiciary’s competence.”155 Having established the court’s 
authority to extend Title VII in this manner, the court then 
rejected Ivy Tech’s argument that because Congress had not 
amended Title VII to include “sexual orientation” as a 
protected class under the statute, this particular claim 
remains unavailable under the statute.156 According to the 
court, and contrary to the opinions of most courts on this 
issue,157 no reliable inference could be drawn from Congress’s 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016), 
rev’d on reh’g, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 153. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 343–44. 
 157. See supra note 2; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 353–54 (Posner, J., 
concurring) (rejecting the “diehard ‘originalist’” approach “that what was believed 
[when Title VII was enacted] in 1964 defines the scope of the statute for as long 
as the statutory text remains unchanged, and therefore until changed by 
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failed attempts to amend Title VII in this manner.158 The 
court noted, for example, that because the EEOC had 
recently ruled that Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination indeed encompasses discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, this “may have caused some in 
Congress to think that legislation is needed to carve sexual 
orientation out of the statute, not to put it in.”159 According 
to the court, this ruling, along with various decisions of the 
Supreme Court shedding new light on Title VII’s existing 
prohibition of “sex discrimination” (including those deeming 
gender stereotyping a form of sex discrimination160), simply 
made it impossible to determine what inference to draw from 
congressional inaction on the subject.161 
Rather than rely on Congress’s failure to amend Title 
VII, the court chose instead to focus on “the [actual] 
provisions of the law that are on the books,”162 in particular, 
the aspect of Title VII prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of “sex,” as that term has been interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court.163 Here, the court stated that when 
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, it “may not have realized 
or understood the full scope of the words it chose.”164 This 
would not limit the court, however, given the notion that 
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil” 
 
Congress’s amending or replacing the statute”). 
 158. Hively, 853 F.3d at 344 (majority opinion). 
 159. Id. at 344 (citing Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 
WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015)). 
 160. Id. at 342. Here, the court seemingly had in mind cases like Price 
Waterhouse, which held that the practice of gender stereotyping falls within Title 
VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. See id. 
 161. Id. at 344. 
 162. Id. at 345. 
 163. See id. at 347 (describing “the interpretative question raised by Hively’s 
case” as follows: “is sexual-orientation discrimination a form of sex 
discrimination, given the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
word ‘sex’ in the statute?”). 
 164. Id. at 345. 
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that prompted a statute’s enactment “to cover reasonably 
comparable evils.”165 The court noted that Title VII, in 
particular “has been understood to cover far more than the 
simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job 
A, or a man for Job B.”166 The Supreme Court has held, for 
example, that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination 
reaches sexual harassment in the workplace,167 including 
same-sex workplace harassment,168 even though such claims 
were not recognized for many years after Title VII was 
enacted.169 Along these lines, Title VII has been held to reach 
discrimination based on “actuarial assumptions about a 
person’s longevity,”170 as well as discrimination based on 
gender non-conforming behavior.171 As the court declared, 
“[i]t is quite possible that these interpretations may . . . have 
surprised” the legislatures who enacted Title VII; 
“[n]evertheless, experience with the law has led the Supreme 
Court to recognize that each of these examples is a covered 
form of sex discrimination.”172 
Having determined that courts may legitimately extend 
Title VII to forms of sex discrimination not envisioned when 
the statute was enacted (a point disputed by the Hively 
 
 165. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 
75, 79–80 (1998)). 
 166. Id. at 345. 
 167. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). 
 168. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. 75). 
 169. As the Hively court noted, the Supreme Court first held that Title VII’s 
prohibition against sex discrimination extends to sexual harassment in the 
workplace in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. This was over 
twenty years after Title VII was enacted. See also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 
883 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing that it was “not necessarily obvious” 
to courts, in the years following Title VII’s enactment, that its prohibition of “sex” 
discrimination would apply to sexual harassment claims). 
 170. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power 
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)). 
 171. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
 172. Id. 
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dissent173), the court then provided three primary bases for 
extending Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to 
sexual orientation discrimination claims: the first based on 
the comparative method of analyzing employment 
discrimination claims, the second employing the 
associational theory of employment discrimination, and the 
third based on cases more generally protecting the right to 
associate intimately with persons of the same sex.174 As 
explained below, aspects of sex-plus discrimination can be 
seen throughout the  first two rationales outlined above. 
Beginning with the “tried-and-true comparative method” 
of analysis, the court declared that “[i]t is critical, in applying 
the comparative method, to be sure that only the variable of 
the plaintiff’s sex is allowed change.”175 Applying what is in 
effect sex-plus analysis, the court then explained that the 
issue “is not whether a lesbian is being treated better or 
worse than gay men, bisexuals, or transsexuals, because 
such a comparison shifts too many pieces at once”; rather, 
“the counterfactual we must use is a situation in which 
Hively is a man, but everything else stays the same: in 
particular, the sex or gender of the partner.”176 
Rephrased in sex-plus terms, in delineating the proper 
comparator for Hively’s sexual orientation discrimination 
 
 173. Id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“When a statute supplies the rule of 
decision, our role is to give effect to the enacted text, interpreting the statutory 
language as a reasonable person would have understood it at the time of 
enactment. We are not authorized to infuse the text with a new or unconventional 
meaning or to update it to respond to changed social, economic, or political 
conditions.”) (emphasis added). 
 174. See id. at 345–52 (majority opinion). 
 175. Id. at 345. 
 176. Id.; see also id. at 347 (“The dissent criticizes us for not trying to rule out 
sexual-orientation discrimination by controlling for it in our comparator 
example. . . . [But] [i]t makes no sense to control for or rule out discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation if the question before us is whether that type of 
discrimination is nothing more or less than a form of sex discrimination.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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claim, the court essentially identified the key variables as 
the plaintiff’s and comparator’s gender (female and male, 
respectively), along with a “plus” factor of attraction to a 
female, as opposed to attraction to members of the same 
sex.177 By holding constant “the sex or gender of the partner” 
(female), as opposed to the homosexuality or bisexuality of 
the plaintiff, a ruling for Hively becomes almost 
inevitable.178 Indeed, immediately following this statement, 
the court declared: 
Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or 
living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had 
stayed the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her 
and would not have fired her. [Assuming these allegations are true], 
[t]his describes paradigmatic sex discrimination.179 
When viewed through a sex-plus lens, the particular 
“plus” factor identified as relevant is critical. Indeed, under 
the alternative formulation endorsed by the dissent, which 
in sex-plus terms contemplates a “plus” factor of attraction to 
members of the same sex,180 a plaintiff like Hively might find 
it more difficult to prove sex discrimination under the 
comparative method, given that an employer who allegedly 
discriminates against female homosexuals is likely to treat 
male homosexuals no differently.181 As the Hively dissent 
 
 177. See id. at 345. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.; see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 
2018) (describing the issue similarly, and concluding, “In the context of sexual 
orientation, a woman who is subject to an adverse employment action because 
she is attracted to women would have been treated differently if she had been a 
man who was attracted to women. We can therefore conclude that sexual 
orientation is a function of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation 
discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination.”). 
 180. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 365 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 181. See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that when Title VII was 
enacted in 1964, the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have only 
applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a homosexual man was 
not, “for in that event the only difference between the two would be the gender of 
the one [who was] fired”). 
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explained: 
[T]he proper comparison is to ask how Ivy Tech treated qualified 
gay men. If an employer is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians, 
then the comparative method has exposed an actual case of sex 
discrimination. If, on the other hand, an employer . . . rejects all 
homosexual applicants, then no inference of sex discrimination is 
possible. . . .182 
Considered in light of sex-plus theory, the dissent’s 
articulation of the discrimination issue differs in respect to 
the “plus” factor identified as relevant. In effect, the “plus” 
factor identified by the majority is attraction to females, 
whereas the “plus” factor identified by the dissent is 
attraction to members of the same sex. This change in focus, 
although subtle, allowed the dissent to reach the opposite 
conclusion in regards to whether sexual orientation 
discrimination constitutes sex discrimination.183 
Nevertheless, it is the wrong approach, particularly at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage presented in Hively, given that 
Hively herself did not allege that her employer discriminated 
against women with same-sex attraction but not men with 
same-sex attraction.184 As explained more fully in the next 
section, the majority’s approach is also more consistent with 
sex-plus discrimination precedents because it more clearly 
exposes an employer’s animus against plaintiffs like Hively 
and reveals discrimination against a particular subgroup of 
female employees, precisely what the sex-plus doctrine is 
designed to do.185 
Returning to the majority’s analysis of Hively’s sexual 
 
 182. Id. at 366–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117 (explaining the flaw in this argument). 
 185. See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a 
heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can 
[claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfavored class are 
discriminated against”). 
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orientation discrimination claim, the court next analogized 
Hively’s claim to those based on gender non-conformity or 
gender stereotypes.186 Again, the court’s analysis here 
reflects sex-plus discrimination theory. The court noted, for 
example, that in 1971 the Supreme Court ruled in Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp. that “Title VII does not permit an 
employer to refuse to hire women with pre-school-age 
children, but not men.”187 Likewise, the court noted its own 
ruling in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., striking down a 
rule requiring only female employees to be unmarried.188 
As explained above, Phillips and Sprogis are each classic 
examples of sex-plus discrimination, as those cases involve 
an employer discriminating against a subset of females on 
the basis of sex (gender) plus another characteristic 
connected to a fundamental right (having young children, or 
being married).189 This point was not lost on the Hively court, 
as immediately after citing Sprogis the court declared: 
In both [Phillips and Sprogis], the employer’s rule did not affect 
every woman in the workforce. Just so here: a policy that 
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does not affect every 
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the 
proper behavior for someone of a given sex. . . . Any . . . job decision 
based on the fact that the complainant—woman or man—dresses 
differently, speaks differently, or dates or marries a same-sex 
partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex. That 
means that it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination . . . .190 
Next, the court turned to the associational theory of 
discrimination, which through a series of judicial rulings 
recognizes that “a person who is discriminated against 
 
 186. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346. 
 187. Id. (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)). 
 188. Id. (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 
1971)). 
 189. See supra Part II.A. 
 190. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346–47. 
1044 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
because of the protected characteristic of one with whom she 
associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her 
own traits.”191 Applying this theory, the court explained that 
there is no meaningful difference between discrimination 
based upon interracial association, which courts routinely 
reject as a form of race discrimination, and claims alleging 
discrimination on the basis of the sex with whom a person 
associates, which should also be unlawful.192 
Here again, the court’s analysis reflects sex-plus theory. 
For example, examining cases finding Title VII violated by 
discriminatory treatment based on an employee’s association 
with a person of another race, the court explained that 
“[c]hanging the race of one partner made a difference in 
determining the legality of the [employer’s] conduct” in those 
cases, such that those cases “rested on ‘distinctions drawn 
according to race.’”193 The same scenario is present here, the 
court explained, because “[i]f we were to change the sex of 
one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be 
different.”194 As the EEOC has so eloquently explained, 
sexual orientation discrimination is “sex” discrimination 
because “an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is alleging that his or her employer took 
his or her sex into account by treating him or her differently 
for associating with a person of the same sex.”195 Thus, the 
EEOC noted, “a gay man who alleges that his employer took 
an adverse employment action against him because he 
associated with or dated men states a claim of sex 
discrimination under Title VII; the fact that the employee is 
a man instead of a woman motivated the employer’s 
 
 191. See id. at 347–48 (summarizing cases applying the associational theory). 
 192. See id. at 348. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 349. 
 195. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 
(July 15, 2015) (emphasis in original). 
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discrimination against him.”196 
In sex-plus terms, the associational theory of 
discrimination, as applied in the sexual orientation 
discrimination context, simply recognizes that it is the 
plaintiff’s sex (e.g., female) combined with the sex of her 
partner (e.g., female) that drives the employer’s 
discriminatory action. In the Hively court’s words, such 
discriminatory animus disappears “[i]f we were to change the 
sex of one partner” in such a relationship, such as by 
considering how an employer treats a male comparator with 
a female partner.197 This is precisely the type of scenario sex-
plus theory is designed to cover (where the plus factor 
consists of having a female partner).198 
In the final section of its opinion, the Hively court 
reviewed a line of Supreme Court decisions protecting the 
right to associate intimately with people of the same sex.199 
Although many of these decisions extend beyond the 
employment context, they are important, according to the 
court, given its task of “consider[ing] what the correct rule of 
law is now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative 
interpretations, not what someone thought it meant one, ten, 
or twenty years ago.”200 
Here, the court referenced two employment 
discrimination cases, Price Waterhouse (holding that gender 
stereotyping falls within Title VII’s prohibition of sex 
discrimination) and Oncale (holding male-on-male sexual 
harassment actionable).201 The court also cited numerous 
cases beyond the employment context, including Romer v. 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. 
 198. See infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 349–50. 
 200. Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. at 342, 349 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)). 
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Evans, in which the Supreme Court found the federal Equal 
Protection Clause violated by the Colorado Constitution’s 
provision forbidding any state governmental organ from 
taking action designed to protect “homosexual, lesbian, or 
bisexual” persons;202 Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court 
struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual 
intimacy between consenting adults as a violation of the 
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause;203 United States 
v. Windsor, which found due process and equal protection 
violations in the Defense of Marriage Act’s exclusion of a 
same-sex partner from the definition of “spouse” in other 
federal statutes;204 and Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck 
down restrictions on the right of same-sex couples to marry 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.205 After summarizing these cases, 
the court concluded that “the time has come” to recognize 
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex 
discrimination under Title VII.206 Accordingly, the court 
ended its opinion similar to how it began by again 
emphasizing the judiciary’s role in expanding Title VII’s 
protections to appropriately modernize the statute,207 a task 
that sex-plus discrimination theory is well-equipped to 
perform. 
In the second of four opinions in the case, Judge Richard 
Posner wrote a concurrence agreeing with the majority while 
suggesting “an alternative approach that may be more 
 
 202. Id. at 349 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)). 
 203. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 204. Id. (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013)). 
 205. Id. at 349–50 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)). 
 206. Id. at 350–51. 
 207. See id; see also id. at 343 (stating that the issue of statutory interpretation 
before the court is “well within the judiciary’s competence”); id. at 345 
(summarizing the lesson of Oncale as follows: “the fact that the enacting Congress 
may not have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in the 
way of the provisions of the law that are on the books”). 
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straightforward.”208 Similar to the majority, Judge Posner 
first articulated the method of statutory interpretation he 
found “most clearly applicable in the present case.”209 This 
particular method goes beyond the original meaning of a 
statute, he explained, and involves “giving a fresh meaning 
to a [statutory or constitutional] statement . . . that infuses 
the statement with vitality and significance today,” thereby 
“making old law satisfy modern needs and 
understandings.”210 Judge Posner noted that Title VII in 
particular is now more than 50 years old, and “invites an 
interpretation that will update it to the present, a present 
that differs markedly from the era in which the Act was 
enacted.”211 
In an important passage for sex-plus theory, Judge 
Posner then noted that when Title VII was enacted in 1964, 
the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have 
only applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a 
homosexual man was not, “for in that event the only 
difference between the two would be the gender of the one 
[who was] fired.”212 He also noted that Title VII does not 
explicitly outlaw sexual orientation discrimination, adding 
further that Title VII’s framers likely did not have 
homosexuality in mind at the time the statute was 
enacted,213 such that “an explanation is needed for how 53 
years later the meaning of the statute has changed and the 
word ‘sex’ now connotes both gender and sexual 
orientation.”214 
Judge Posner provided that “explanation” by again 
 
 208. Id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 353. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. (emphasis in original). 
1048 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
reiterating his expansive view of the judiciary’s role in 
interpreting statutes and constitutional provisions.215 He 
wrote, for example, that “statutory and constitutional 
provisions frequently are interpreted on the basis of present 
need and understanding rather than original meaning,” and 
cited numerous case examples adopting that approach.216 
This assertion then led Judge Posner to perhaps the most 
controversial statement across the range of Hively opinions, 
in which he stated that, rather than merely interpreting Title 
VII in light of changing times, the Hively court is instead 
“rewriting” the statute to give it “a new, a broader 
meaning,”217 one which the Congress that enacted Title VII 
“would not have accepted.”218 
From there, Judge Posner then turned to the task of 
defending his interpretation of the word “sex” as 
encompassing both gender and sexual orientation.219 The 
rationale offered by Judge Posner to justify this “admittedly 
loose” interpretation of sex discrimination220 largely rests on 
sex-plus theory. In one passage, for example, Judge Posner 
explained that because sexual orientation is innate, rather 
than chosen, discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation should be unlawful.221 He wrote: 
The position of a woman discriminated against on account of being 
a lesbian is thus analogous to a woman’s being discriminated 
against on account of being a woman. That woman didn’t choose to 
be a woman; the lesbian didn’t choose to be a lesbian. I don’t see 
 
 215. Id. at 353–54. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 354; see also id. at 357 (“I . . . acknowledge openly that today we, 
who are judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-century-
old statute a meaning of ‘sex discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it 
would not have accepted. This is something courts do fairly frequently . . . .”). 
 218. Id. at 357. 
 219. See id. at 354–56. 
 220. Id. at 355. 
 221. Id. at 354–55. 
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why firing a lesbian because she is in the subset of women who are 
lesbian should be thought any less a form of sex discrimination than 
firing a woman because she’s a woman.222 
Recall that the sex-plus doctrine prohibits 
discrimination against a subset of male or female employees 
based on either the exercise of a fundamental right or an 
immutable characteristic, one the employee cannot 
change.223 Although Judge Posner’s analysis, quoted above, 
does not explicitly reference sex-plus discrimination 
doctrine, his reasoning echoes the theory. Judge Posner 
states, for example, that “the lesbian didn’t choose to be a 
lesbian,”224 indicating that, in his view, sexual preferences 
are immutable.225 He also “do[es]n’t see why firing a lesbian 
because she is in the subset of women who are lesbian should 
be thought any less a form of sex discrimination than firing 
a woman because she’s a woman.”226 Neither does sex-plus 
theory, given that the subset of women comprised of lesbians 
would involve “plus” factors of immutable characteristics or 
fundamental rights, a point developed more fully in the 
section to follow.227 
In another striking passage reminiscent of sex-plus 
theory, Judge Posner ratified the majority’s statement that 
“Ivy Tech is disadvantaging [Hively] because she is a 
woman,” not a man, who prefers female partners.228 He then 
wrote: “That’s a different type of sex discrimination from the 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. See supra Part II. 
 224. Hively, 853 F.3d at 355. 
 225. See id. at 354 (citing Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014)) 
(explaining that the Seventh Circuit, in 2014, examined whether homosexual 
orientation is innate or chosen, and determined that “the scientific literature 
strongly supports the proposition that it is biological and innate, not a choice like 
deciding how to dress”). 
 226. Id. at 355. 
 227. See infra notes 286, 290 and accompanying text. 
 228. Hively, 853 F.3d at 356 (emphasis in original). 
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classic cases of old in which women were erroneously 
(sometimes maliciously) deemed unqualified for certain jobs” 
simply because they were women.229 
Judge Posner is correct. In sex-plus terms, the “different 
type of sex discrimination” to which he refers is, in fact, 
discrimination on the basis of sex plus a certain sexual 
preference, i.e., for female partners. As Judge Posner notes, 
this is indeed different from classic cases of pure gender 
discrimination, but it is gender discrimination 
nonetheless.230 
Hively’s closest analog to sex-plus theory is contained in 
the third opinion in the case, a concurring opinion written by 
Judge Joel Flaum and joined by Judge Kenneth Ripple.231 
Similar to the previous two opinions, Judge Flaum described 
the issue as whether “discrimination based on Professor 
Hively’s ‘sexual orientation’ constitute[s] discrimination 
based on her ‘sex’” under Title VII.232 Judge Flaum concluded 
that it does.233 
To establish the necessary connection to Hively’s 
gender,234 Judge Flaum reiterated Hively’s argument that 
Ivy Tech “relied on her sex, because, but for her sex, she 
would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a 
heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can 
[claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfavored class are 
discriminated against”). 
 231. Hively, 853 F.3d at 357–59 (Flaum, J., concurring). 
 232. Id. at 357 (“I find the issue before us is simply whether discriminating 
against an employee for being homosexual violates Title VII’s prohibition against 
discriminating against that employee because of their sex”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. at 358 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989), for the proposition that an employee alleging sex discrimination “must 
show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.”). 
2019] SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 1051 
have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was 
sexually attracted to women).”235 From there, the judge 
declared, “[t]here is no allegation [in Hively’s case] that the 
College refused to promote women; nor is there an allegation 
that it refused to promote those who associate with 
women.”236 Rather, the judge declared, “Ivy Tech’s alleged 
animus was against Professor Hively’s sexual orientation—
a combination of these two factors.”237 
Having stated Hively’s argument in this manner—one 
that is nothing more than a claim of sex-plus discrimination 
based on the combination of both Hively’s gender and her 
association with women—Judge Flaum declared that 
“discrimination against an employee on the basis of their 
homosexuality is necessarily, in part, discrimination based 
on their sex.”238 As Judge Flaum explained, homosexuality is 
marked by attraction to individuals of the “same sex.”239 
Accordingly, “[o]ne cannot consider a person’s homosexuality 
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render 
‘same’ [sex] meaningless.”240 As such, the judge explained, 
“discriminating against that employee because they are 
homosexual constitutes discriminating against an employee 
because of (A) the employee’s sex, and (B) their sexual 
attraction to individuals of the same sex. And ‘sex,’ under 
Title VII, is an enumerated trait.”241 Finally, the judge noted, 
Title VII requires a plaintiff like Hively to prove only that 
her sex was “a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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practice.”242 Accordingly, unlawful “sex” discrimination 
occurs when an employer discriminates against an employee 
because they are homosexual.243 
Judge Flaum’s analysis most closely resembles sex-plus 
discrimination theory, in that it explicitly recognizes that 
Hively’s claim is based upon “a combination” of both her 
gender and her attraction to women, which together 
produced the “alleged animus” for which she complained.244 
Although Judge Flaum did not mention the sex-plus theory 
in his analysis, the sex-plus doctrine is implicit within it.245 
As such, the sex-plus theory appears to be a viable argument 
for litigants to present in cases similar to Hively’s. 
B. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,246 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the Seventh 
Circuit in extending Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” 
discrimination to claims of sexual orientation 
discrimination.247 Although the Zarda court’s analysis is less 
obviously related to sex-plus theory, the opinion is 
undoubtedly significant, and employs a strikingly similar 
structure to the majority opinion in Hively. 
 
 242. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)). 
 243. See id. at 359 (“[I]f discriminating against an employee because she is 
homosexual is equivalent to discriminating against her because she is (A) a 
woman who is (B) sexually attracted to women, then it is motivated, in part, by 
an enumerated trait: the employee’s sex. That is all an employee must show to 
successfully allege a Title VII claim.”). 
 244. See id. at 358. 
 245. See, e.g., id. at 359 (“Ivy Tech allegedly refused to promote Professor 
Hively because she was homosexual—or (A) a woman who is (B) sexually 
attracted to women. Thus, the College allegedly discriminated against Professor 
Hively, at least in part, because of her sex. . . . Title VII, as its text provides, does 
not allow this.”). 
 246. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 247. Id. at 107–08. 
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Similar to the Hively majority, the en banc court in 
Zarda began its analysis of Zarda’s sexual orientation 
discrimination claim by emphasizing its task of simply 
interpreting Title VII’s existing prohibition of “sex” 
discrimination, as that text has been interpreted by the 
Supreme Court.248 Also similar to Hively, the Zarda court 
declared that Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination 
should be interpreted broadly,249 consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s view that Title VII covers not just “the 
principal evil” that led to Title VII’s enactment, but also 
“reasonably comparable evils” that meet the statutory 
requirements.250 Finally, the court stated that “the critical 
inquiry” in a Title VII sex discrimination claim is to 
determine whether the plaintiff’s sex was “a motivating 
factor” in the employer’s decision.251 As such, the court 
described the issue as “whether an employee’s sex is 
necessarily a motivating factor in discrimination based on 
sexual orientation,” so as to make sexual orientation 
discrimination claims a subset of sex discrimination 
claims.252 And on that issue, the court agreed with Hively 
that “sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least 
 
 248. Id. at 111–12 (“In deciding whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation 
discrimination, we are guided, as always, by the text and, in particular, by the 
phrase ‘because of . . . sex.’ However, in interpreting this language, we do not 
write on a blank slate. Instead, we must construe the text in light of the entirety 
of the statute as well as relevant precedent.”); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347 
(describing “the interpretative question raised by Hively’s case” as follows: “is 
sexual-orientation discrimination a form of sex discrimination, given the way in 
which the Supreme Court has interpreted the word ‘sex’ in the statute?”). 
 249. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 111. 
 250. Id. at 112 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
79 (1998)); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 344–45. 
 251. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)); cf. Hively, 853 
F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (also highlighting the “motivating factor” 
standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)). 
 252. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (describing the issue in 
that case as “whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset 
of actions taken on the basis of sex”). 
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in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination.”253 
Similar to Hively, and borrowing as well from the 
EEOC’s reasoning in Baldwin, the Zarda court then 
provided three primary reasons for extending Title VII’s 
prohibition of “sex” discrimination to claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination: the first based on the plain text 
of Title VII, including the comparative method of analyzing 
employment discrimination claims; the second based on 
gender stereotyping precedents; and the third employing the 
associational theory of discrimination.254 
From the perspective of sex-plus discrimination analysis, 
the Zarda court’s first articulated rationale is most 
significant. The court began this particular analysis by 
declaring that “sex is necessarily a factor in sexual 
orientation.”255 “Sexual orientation,” the court explained, 
refers to “a person’s predisposition or inclination toward 
sexual activity or behavior with other males or 
females,” and is commonly characterized as heterosexuality, 
homosexuality, or bisexuality.256 Homosexuality, for 
example, is “characterized by sexual desire for a person of 
the same sex.”257 Accordingly, to identify a person’s sexual 
orientation, one must know both “the sex of the person and 
that of the people to whom he or she is attracted.”258 For this 
reason, the court explained, “sexual orientation is a function 
of sex,” and is in fact “doubly delineated by sex because it is 
a function of both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom 
 
 253. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (describing Hively’s 
claim as “paradigmatic sex discrimination”). 
 254. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13; cf. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 
0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5–8 (July 15, 2015) (presenting similar 
rationales). 
 255. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112. 
 256. Id. at 113 (quoting Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014)). 
 257. Id. (quoting Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
 258. Id. 
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he or she is attracted.”259 Finally, the court declared, 
“because sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a 
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that 
sexual orientation is also protected.”260 
Although the hints of sex-plus discrimination are more 
subtle than in Hively, the sex-plus doctrine is nevertheless 
reflected in the Zarda court’s analysis above. As the court 
explained, a person’s “sexual orientation” is “doubly 
delineated by sex because it is a function of both a person’s 
sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is attracted.”261 
Accordingly, discriminating against a gay male because of 
his sexual orientation is equivalent to discriminating against 
him because of (A) his own sex, male; and (B) his attraction 
to males.262 From a male plaintiff’s perspective, this 
combination of factors describes an instance of sex-plus 
discrimination involving a plus factor—attraction to males—
consisting of an immutable characteristic. And as the Hively 
court declared, if one “were to change the sex of one partner 
in a [homosexual] relationship”—here, by considering a 
female comparator who is likewise attracted to males—the 
result would be different.263 Or, as the EEOC artfully 
explained: if an employer suspends a lesbian employee for 
displaying a photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does 
not suspend a male employee for displaying a photo of his 
female spouse on his desk, that action necessarily entails 
treating the female employee less favorably because of her 
sex, because “but for” that characteristic, her suspension 
would not have occurred.264 Although in this passage the 
 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See id. (quoting Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
 263. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. 
 264. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 
(July 15, 2015) (citing Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 711 (1978)). 
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EEOC purports to describe an instance of pure sex 
discrimination, the plus factor at issue—having a female 
spouse—is central to the analysis. Moreover, the claim here 
would not be that the employer is discriminating against 
females as a whole, but rather only against the particular 
subset of females with female partners. Sex-plus theory is 
tailor-made for those circumstances. 
V. HOW SEX-PLUS THEORY AUTHORIZES TITLE VII SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
By this point, it should be obvious that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex-plus discrimination, such that 
no amendment to Title VII is needed for courts to apply the 
statute in that manner. A comparison to Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp.265 further reveals how sex-plus theory 
exposes sexual orientation discrimination claims as a subset 
of sex discrimination claims. 
In Phillips, the Court found an employer liable for sex 
discrimination due to its policy of refusing to hire women, but 
not men, with pre-school aged children.266 As the Phillips 
Court succinctly declared, Title VII “requires that persons of 
like qualifications be given employment opportunities 
irrespective of their sex,” a principle violated by the 
employer’s gender-based hiring policies.267 
In Phillips, the plaintiff belonged to a subgroup of 
women consisting of women with pre-school aged children; 
the comparator group, treated more favorably by the 
employer, consisted of men with pre-school aged children.268 
In that context, a female applicant’s sex and the “plus” factor 
of having young children combined to produce the employer’s 
specific discriminatory animus, leading to gender-based 
 
 265. 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
 266. Id. at 544. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
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differences in hiring. Accordingly, if one were to change 
either of those variables—by considering either a male 
applicant with young children or a female applicant without 
young children—the employer’s specific discriminatory 
animus would disappear. 
This is also the case with sexual orientation 
discrimination. Take, for example, a lesbian plaintiff who 
experiences a hostile work environment and is eventually 
fired due to her employer’s anti-gay bias. Under a sex-plus 
analysis, the plaintiff’s relevant subgroup of women would be 
those attracted to other women; the comparator group, 
treated more favorably by the employer, would consist of men 
who share the same plus factor, attraction to women. Finally, 
just as in Phillips, the lesbian plaintiff’s sex (female) would 
combine with the plus factor (attraction to women) to 
generate the employer’s specific discriminatory animus. If 
one were to change either of those two variables—by 
considering either a male employee attracted to females or a 
female employee attracted to males—the employer’s 
discriminatory animus disappears. Thus, just as in Phillips, 
the plaintiff’s sex is necessarily a motivating factor in the 
employer’s decision, which is all that Title VII requires.269 
In the example of a sex-plus discrimination claim 
brought by a lesbian plaintiff, the plus characteristic that 
matters is the fact of being attracted to females, as it is this 
particular plus factor that triggers the employer’s 
discriminatory animus. This, in turn, makes the relevant 
comparator subgroup men who are likewise attracted to 
females. From there, it would ordinarily be easy for a lesbian 
plaintiff possessing evidence of sexual orientation 
discrimination to prove a difference in treatment between 
females who are attracted to females, as compared to males 
 
 269. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also Franchina v. City of 
Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 53 (noting that Title VII’s text “bars discrimination 
when sex is ‘a motivating factor,’ not ‘the motivating factor’”). 
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attracted to females, thereby establishing an instance of sex-
plus discrimination.270 As such, the only question remaining 
is whether the relevant plus factor, sexual attraction, 
involves an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right, 
either of which sex-plus theory typically requires.271 
A. Intimate Association as a Fundamental Right 
There is no doubt that a person’s intimate association 
with another implicates fundamental rights. This much the 
Supreme Court made clear in Obergefell v. Hodges,272 as well 
as the cases leading up to it. 
In Obergefell, the Court considered whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment was violated by state statutes that 
either denied same-sex couples the right to marry or denied 
recognition to lawful same-sex marriages performed in 
another state.273 The Court analyzed these issues primarily 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
which declares that “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”274 The 
“fundamental rights” protected by this Clause, the Court 
noted, include “interests of the person so fundamental that 
the State must accord them its respect,”275 and consist of 
 
 270. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (finding that a policy of refusing to hire 
women with pre-school age children discriminates on the basis of sex where there 
was no similar policy for men with such children). 
 271. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 
1975); cf. Valdes v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., (The Kemper Grp.), 507 F. Supp. 
10, 12 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (recognizing that “[i]f one’s sexual preference is such a 
‘fundamental right’ or ‘immutable’ characteristic, it would seem that an employer 
may not discriminate between male and female homosexuals,” but determining 
that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had seemingly “adopted a different 
approach” in a case concluding that discrimination against “effeminate” males 
does not constitute sex discrimination). 
 272. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 273. Id. at 2593. 
 274. Id. at 2597 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV). 
 275. Id. at 2598. 
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“certain personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal 
identity and beliefs.”276 Marriage, the Court declared, is 
among those liberties, such that “the right to marry is 
fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”277 Examining 
whether the right to marry encompasses same-sex marriage, 
the Court then noted that although its previous cases 
“presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners,” 
the rationales underlying those cases apply with equal force 
to same-sex couples, which “compels the conclusion that 
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”278 
Accordingly, the Court held that same-sex couples may not 
be deprived of the fundamental right to marry.279 
Although Obergefell contains a lengthy discussion of the 
fundamental nature of marriage,280 prior to Obergefell the 
Court had been moving towards recognizing intimate 
association as a fundamental right, both for opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples.281 In 1996, for example, the Court 
in Romer v. Evans invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s 
Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or political 
subdivision of the State from protecting persons against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.282 Then, in 2003, 
 
 276. Id. at 2597. 
 277. Id. at 2598 (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated 
that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”); see also 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing the right to marry as a 
“fundamental freedom” and stating that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men”). 
 278. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598–99 (“[T]he reasons marriage is fundamental 
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”). 
 279. Id. at 2604–05 (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise 
the fundamental right to marry.”). 
 280. See id. at 2598–2602. 
 281. See id. at 2596–2600 (summarizing these and other cases). 
 282. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996); see also Gregory M. Herek et al., Demographic, 
Psychological, and Social Characteristics of Self–Identified Lesbian, Gay, and 
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the Court in Lawrence v. Texas invalidated laws that made 
same-sex intimacy a criminal act.283 The Obergefell Court 
later described Lawrence as holding that “same-sex couples 
have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate 
association,”284 providing support for the notion that 
intimate association with a person of the same sex, even in 
the absence of marriage, can be linked to a fundamental 
right.285 Once this is established, a plus factor involving an 
employee’s intimate association with a person of the same 
sex would trigger the sex-plus doctrine.286 
B. Sexual Attraction as Immutable 
Even assuming there is no fundamental right to 
intimately associate with a person of the same sex, a 
plaintiff-employee’s sexual attraction to a person of the same 
sex could, at least for many plaintiffs, be considered 
immutable. 
In Baskin v. Bogan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
discussed at length whether homosexual orientation is 
innate or chosen, and found that the scientific literature 
 
Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 176, 
177 (2010) (stating that “sexual orientation is a multifaceted construct that 
encompasses sexual attraction, sexual behavior, personal identity, romantic 
relationships, and community membership.”). 
 283. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2604 
(stating that “[a]lthough Lawrence elaborated its holding under the Due Process 
Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to remedy, the continuing inequality that 
resulted from laws making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime”). 
 285. See id. at 2600 (“[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that 
allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it 
does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, 
but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”); id. at 2602 (describing “the 
approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including 
marriage and intimacy” (emphasis added)). 
 286. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 
1975) (“[A]n employer cannot have one hiring policy for men and another for 
women if the distinction is based on some fundamental right.”). 
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strongly supports the proposition that it is biological and 
innate, rather than a choice.287 As Judge Posner later 
explained in Hively, this finding is important because it 
makes “[t]he position of a woman discriminated against on 
account of being a lesbian . . . analogous to a woman’s being 
discriminated against on account of being a woman.”288 As 
Judge Posner declared, just like a woman does not choose to 
be a woman, “the lesbian didn’t choose to be a lesbian.”289 
Accordingly, “firing a lesbian because she is in the subset of 
women who are lesbian [is no] less a form of sex 
discrimination than firing a woman because she’s a 
woman.”290 
As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, scientific 
literature supports the proposition that homosexual 
orientation is biological and innate, making it an immutable 
characteristic similar to one’s race or national origin.291 Such 
evidence could help build the case for treating sexual 
orientation discrimination as a form of unlawful sex-plus 
discrimination. 
In a study examining this issue, researchers Gregory M. 
Herek, Aaron T. Norton, Thomas J. Allen, and Charles L. 
Sims, examined data from a U.S. national probability sample 
consisting of 662 self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
 
 287. 766 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding “little doubt that sexual 
orientation . . . is an immutable (and probably an innate, in the sense of in-born) 
characteristic rather than a choice.”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing 
Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7–17) (“Only 
in more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual 
orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”). 
 288. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 354–55 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 289. Id. at 355. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 657; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 363 (Sykes, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “sex” and “sexual orientation” are “different immutable 
characteristic[s]”). 
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adults,292 and determined that the vast majority of 
respondents reported experiencing little or no choice about 
their sexual orientation.293 In their study, perceived choice 
about one’s sexual orientation was assessed with the 
question, “How much choice do you feel you had about being 
[L[esbian]/G[ay]/B[isexual]/Q[ueer]/H[omosexual]]?”294 The 
response options were “no choice at all,” “a small amount of 
choice,” “a fair amount of choice,” and “a great deal of 
choice.”295 With 95% confidence intervals,296 the authors 
reported that 60.6% of respondents reported having “no 
choice at all,” 14.2% reported having “a small amount of 
choice,” and 25.2% reported having either “a fair amount” or 
“great deal of” choice in their specific sexual orientation.297 
According to the authors, “[o]verall, respondents reported 
that they did not experience their sexual orientation as a 
choice,” but “[t]his pattern varied somewhat . . . according to 
gender and sexual orientation.”298 For example, nearly nine 
out of ten gay men (88%), and roughly two thirds of lesbians 
(68%) reported having no choice at all about their sexual 
orientation.299 In addition, “[c]ombining respondents who 
said they’d had a small amount of choice with those reporting 
no choice, 95% of gay men and 84% of lesbians could be 
characterized as perceiving that they had little or no choice 
 
 292. Herek et al., supra note 282, at 176, 178; see also id. at 179–80 (describing 
the sample). 
 293. Id. at 176. 
 294. Id. at 180. As the authors note, respondents were asked to indicate their 
preferred term for characterizing their own sexual orientation (e.g., “Gay,” 
“Lesbian,” “Bisexual,” “Queer,” “Homosexual”). This label was subsequently 
inserted into questions that referred to the respondent’s sexual orientation or 
identity. This individualized item wording is indicated throughout their article 
as [L/G/B/Q/H]. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 181. 
 297. Id. at 186 (reporting results at Table 3). 
 298. Id. at 188. 
 299. Id. 
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about their sexual orientation.”300 Reaching a similar 
conclusion, the American Psychological Association has said 
that “most people experience little or no sense of choice about 
their sexual orientation.”301 Thus, although there will always 
be those who believe homosexuality represents a willful 
choice,302 those with that orientation often do not perceive it 
that way.303 
Beyond the argument that Congress, rather than courts, 
should decide whether sexual orientation discrimination 
should be outlawed under Title VII as a matter of public 
policy,304 perhaps the biggest objection to the sex-plus 
argument outlined in this Article is that it considers the 
wrong plus factor, thereby failing to demonstrate 
discrimination on the basis of sex. As the competing Hively 
opinions demonstrate (albeit without actually examining the 
issue from a sex-plus perspective), there are essentially two 
ways to state the relevant plus factor in a case involving 
alleged sexual orientation discrimination. 
The first, plaintiff-friendly view, is to state the relevant 
plus characteristic as attraction to members of the plaintiff’s 
same sex. In the hypothetical scenario of a lesbian plaintiff, 
the plus factor would thus become attraction to females. 
From there, sex discrimination can be revealed by holding 
constant that particular plus factor (i.e., attraction to 
females) and examining whether there is evidence of 
differential treatment between the plaintiff and males who 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Answers to Your Questions: For a Better Understanding of Sexual 
Orientation & Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/ 
topics/lgbt/orientation (last visited July 13, 2019) (under the heading “What 
causes a person to have a particular sexual orientation?”). 
 302. See generally DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND 
THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1997). 
 303. See Herek et al., supra note 282, at 195. 
 304. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text. 
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are likewise attracted to females.305 
The alternative, employer-friendly view, is to state the 
relevant plus characteristic as a particular sexual 
orientation, here, homosexuality.306 In this respect, a lesbian 
plaintiff like Hively might find it more difficult to prove the 
requisite sex discrimination under Title VII, given that an 
employer who allegedly discriminates against female 
homosexuals would likely treat the relevant male 
comparator sharing that particular plus factor, male 
homosexuals, no differently.307 
For a sex-plus discrimination claim brought by a lesbian 
employee, however, the truly relevant comparator group of 
the opposite gender is not gay males, as the Hively dissent 
posits.308 Rather, it is males sharing the identical plus factor 
that in fact triggers the employer’s animus against the 
particular subset of women who are gay: attraction to 
females.309 The Seventh Circuit addressed this very issue in 
Hively, and rejected the dissent’s comparator of homosexual 
males through an analogy to Loving, in which the Supreme 
Court deemed unconstitutional certain state statutes 
preventing marriages between persons on the basis of racial 
 
 305. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (Flaum, J., 
concurring) (articulating the plaintiff’s argument as follows: “Professor Hively 
argues that [in refusing to promote her] the College relied on her sex, because, 
but for her sex, she would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not 
have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was sexually attracted to 
women).”) (emphasis in original). 
 306. Id. at 345 (majority opinion). 
 307. See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that when Title VII was 
enacted in 1964, the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have only 
applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a homosexual man was 
not, “for in that event the only difference between the two would be the gender of 
the one [who was] fired.”). 
 308. See id. at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 309. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that a lesbian plaintiff alleging sexual 
harassment under a sex-plus theory must present evidence of a comparative class 
of gay males who were not discriminated against). 
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classifications.310 The Hively court explained: 
The dissent would instead have us compare the treatment of men 
who are attracted to members of the male sex with the treatment of 
women who are attracted to members of the female sex, and ask 
whether an employer treats the men differently from the 
women. . . . Loving shows why this fails. In the context of interracial 
relationships, we could just as easily hold constant a variable such 
as “sexual or romantic attraction to persons of a different race” and 
ask whether an employer treated persons of different races who 
shared that propensity the same. That is precisely the rule that 
Loving rejected, and so too must we, in the context of sexual 
associations. . . . No matter which [Title VII] category is involved, 
the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering 
the adverse action had his or her sex [or] race . . . been different.311 
Because the Supreme Court in Loving effectively 
rejected the defendant’s proposed comparator of a person of 
a different race than the plaintiff who associates with 
someone of a different race than the comparator, which is 
analogous to that advocated by the Hively dissent (i.e., an 
opposite-sex comparator who is attracted to members of the 
comparator’s same sex), courts examining sexual orientation 
discrimination claims under a sex-plus theory should 
likewise reject the type of comparator advocated by the 
Hively dissent.312 
Aside from the analogy to Loving outlined above, even if 
a court were to isolate an employer’s treatment of both 
female and male homosexuals, this would not rule out the 
possibility of discriminatory intent against a plaintiff like 
Hively.313 After all, the comparative method is just one 
 
 310. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
 311. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (majority opinion); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–
8 (describing the State of Virginia’s argument in that case, which the Supreme 
Court rejected). 
 312. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349. 
 313. Of course, there may be times where an employer harbors discriminatory 
animus against female homosexuals but not male homosexuals. Where such 
animus results in adverse employment actions against lesbians but not gay 
males, gender discrimination has necessarily occurred. Hively, 853 F.3d at 366 
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method of proving discrimination.314 Primarily used as an 
evidentiary test,315 the comparative method is particularly 
helpful when a plaintiff attempts to prove discrimination 
through circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.316 
Where direct evidence of discriminatory intent exists, 
however, the comparative method is unnecessary.317 For this 
reason, courts upholding sex-plus discrimination claims have 
often relied on other forms of evidence, beyond comparators, 
to reveal the employer’s unique discriminatory animus. 
In Lam,318 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals relied on evidence that members of the 
appointments committee in Lam’s case were particularly 
biased against women and Asians.319 According to the Ninth 
Circuit, this evidence was sufficient to preclude summary 
judgment for the defendants on Lam’s sex-plus-race 
discrimination claim.320 Likewise, in a sex-plus 
 
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (“If an employer is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians, 
then the comparative method has exposed an actual case of sex discrimination.”). 
 314. See id. at 365–66 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (explaining how the comparative 
method is often used as a method of proving that an employer acted with a 
discriminatory motive in a given case). 
 315. See id. 
 316. See Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (characterizing comparative evidence as circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent). 
 317. See id.; see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) 
(recognizing that a Title VII plaintiff may prove his case using either direct or 
circumstantial evidence); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving 
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 204 (2009) (discussing the 
use of comparator evidence in discrimination cases and stating that “the lower 
courts have pretty clearly rejected comparator proof as necessary.”); see also, e.g., 
Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding 
alleged statement that plaintiff was “too old” to be direct evidence of age 
discrimination); Van Voorhis v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 512 F.3d 
1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) (classifying an employer’s statement of not wanting 
to hire “any old pilots” as direct evidence). 
 318. Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 319. Id. at 1560. 
 320. Id. 
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discrimination claim involving a fundamental right, the 
court in McGrenaghan ruled that a teacher could maintain a 
Title VII sex discrimination claim as a member of a subclass 
of women with disabled children based on evidence of 
discriminatory animus specific to such women, including 
direct evidence of discriminatory animus by the school’s 
principal.321 And most importantly, given such evidence, the 
McGrenaghan court did not consider whether the employer 
harbored a similar animus against fathers with disabled 
children.322 
As Lam and McGrenaghan show, although comparator 
evidence across genders could certainly help prove 
discrimination based on sex where such evidence is 
necessary to expose the employer’s discriminatory animus, 
what matters most is whether a plaintiff like Hively can 
prove her employer acted on the basis of a discriminatory 
animus directed against her, in particular, because of her sex 
in combination with an immutable characteristic or 
fundamental right.323 The concurring judges in Hively 
recognized this when they wrote: “The foregoing analysis 
should obtain even if an employer allegedly discriminates 
against all homosexual employees. In that case, the 
employer’s discrimination across sexes does not demonstrate 
that sex is irrelevant, but rather that each individual has a 
plausible sex-based discrimination claim.”324 The majority in 
Zarda made the same point when it noted that the employer 
 
 321. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 322. See id. at 326–27 (denying summary judgment to the defendant-employer 
without considering such comparative evidence). 
 323. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1559 (noting that “the existence of a discriminatory 
motive for the employment decision will generally be the principal question” in 
an employment discrimination case). 
 324. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 359 n.2 (7th Cir. 
2017) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“When confronting claims that are inherently 
based in part on sex, such as discrimination against homosexuals, each 
employee’s claim satisfies Title VII on its face, no matter the sex of any other 
employee who experienced discrimination.”). 
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in Price Waterhouse could not have defended itself against 
Hopkins’s gender non-conformity claim by arguing that it 
fired a gender-non-conforming man as well as a gender-non-
conforming woman.325 “To the contrary,” the court noted, 
“this claim would merely be an admission that the employer 
has doubly violated Title VII by using gender stereotypes to 
discriminate against both men and women.”326 The same 
result should apply when an employer discriminates against 
all employees, male and female, based on stereotypes about 
the gender to which the employees should be attracted, as 
this is nothing more than “a double-edged sword that cuts 
both men and women” the same.327 For these reasons and 
others, numerous scholars agree that the comparative 
method of proving employment discrimination has its 
flaws.328 
In sum, where a female plaintiff alleges sex 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the 
relevant subclass of women consists of women who are 
sexually attracted to other women. Under precedents like 
Lam, McGrenaghan, Hively, and Zarda, if a plaintiff 
presents evidence of discriminatory animus against her 
particular subset of women, that is all the plaintiff must 
show. This point was made explicit in a 2018 First Circuit 
 
 325. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 123 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE 
L.J. 728, 731 (2011) (arguing that “the most traditional and widely used 
heuristic—comparators, who are similar to the complainant in all respects but 
for the protected characteristic—is barely functional in today’s economy and is 
largely unresponsive to updated understandings of discrimination”); id. at 733 
(noting that under the comparative method, “however abusively an employer 
treats its employees, the bad acts do not present a discrimination problem so long 
as they are committed in an evenhanded fashion.”); id. at 751 (noting that “[a]s a 
practical matter, comparators are hard to find even in workplaces with a diverse 
group of employees,” and that “conceptually, the existence of a comparator is 
simply not relevant, under some discrimination theories, to the question whether 
discrimination has occurred”). 
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Court of Appeals decision, Franchina v. City of Providence,329 
applying the sex-plus doctrine to a Title VII claim (albeit one 
involving allegations of a sexually hostile work environment 
based in part on evidence of pure gender discrimination).330 
In Franchina, a former female firefighter of the 
Providence, Rhode Island, fire department, Lori Franchina, 
sued the city, its fire department, and union asserting a Title 
VII claim for hostile work environment based on her gender, 
as well as a retaliation claim for having reported the 
harassment to her superiors.331 After trial, a jury ruled in 
Franchina’s favor on each of her claims, and awarded her 
front pay and emotional damages.332 
In its attempt to overturn the jury’s verdict on the sexual 
harassment charge,333 the City argued on appeal that 
Franchina failed to present sufficient evidence under a sex-
plus theory of discrimination as required by the First 
Circuit’s Title VII jurisprudence.334 Specifically, the City 
argued that for a plaintiff like Franchina to be successful 
under a sex-plus theory, the plaintiff must “identify a 
corresponding sub-class of the opposite gender and show that 
the corresponding class was not subject to similar 
harassment or discrimination.”335 Thus, the City argued that 
Franchina “is required to have presented evidence at trial of 
a comparative class of gay male firefighters who were not 
discriminated against” because, in the City’s view, without 
 
 329. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(summarizing Franchina’s claims). 
 330. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Lori Franchina at 26, Franchina v. City of 
Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (No. 16-2401). 
 331. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 37, 45–46. 
 332. Id. at 37–38. 
 333. See id. at 46 (“On appeal, the City shines its spotlight solely on the hostile 
work environment cause of action.”). 
 334. Id. at 51. 
 335. Id. at 52. 
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such evidence, “it would not be possible to prove that any sort 
of differential treatment a plaintiff experiences is necessarily 
predicated on his or her gender.”336 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the City’s 
argument for numerous reasons.337 First, the court declared 
that the City’s argument, if accepted, “would permit 
employers to discriminate free from Title VII recourse so long 
as they do not employ any subclass member of the opposite 
gender.”338 This result, according to the court, cannot be 
correct, as it would “be inapposite to Title VII’s mandate 
against sex-based discrimination.”339 In a related point, the 
court declared that “discrimination against one employee 
cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against 
another employee in that same group.”340 For this reason, the 
court noted, “discrimination [that] adversely affects only a 
portion of the protected class” remains unlawful.341 
“Similarly,” the court declared, “the effect of Title VII is not 
to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects a 
plaintiff who is unlucky enough to lack a comparator in his 
 
 336. Id. 
 337. See id. at 52 (stating that the City’s argument “has some rather obvious 
flaws”). But see Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 
1202–04 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling in a sex-plus-marital status claim that a female 
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were 
treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for plaintiff due to a lack of 
evidence on that point). 
 338. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52. 
 339. Id. at 53. 
 340. Id. (quoting Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir. 
2009)); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (stating that the 
purpose of Title VII “is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the 
protection of the minority group as a whole,” and explaining that in enacting Title 
VII, “Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against 
some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats 
other members of the employees’ group”). 
 341. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
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or her workplace.”342 
Finally, the court declared that the City’s proposed 
comparator requirement “conflicts also with Title VII’s text 
and jurisprudence.”343 The court explained: 
Requiring a plaintiff to point to a comparator of the opposite gender 
implies the inquiry is that of “but-for” causation. That is to say, the 
City’s approach requires Franchina to make a showing that, all else 
being equal (the “plus” factors being the same), the discrimination 
would not have occurred but for her gender. Title VII requires no 
such proof. The text bars discrimination when sex is “a motivating 
factor,” not “the motivating factor.”344 
Regarding this latter point, the court concluded by 
noting that the label, sex-plus, “does not mean that more 
than simple sex discrimination must be alleged.”345 Rather, 
the court observed, “the sex-plus label is no more than a 
heuristic . . . to affirm that plaintiffs can, under certain 
circumstances, survive summary judgment [and obtain a 
favorable verdict at trial] even when not all members of a 
disfavored class are discriminated against.”346 
As Franchina observed, the sex-plus theory of 
discrimination is merely a tool for unveiling discrimination 
against a particular subset of male or female employees 
where an employer treats only that particular subset in a 
sexually discriminatory manner.347 Moreover, it is well 
established that an employer in a sex-plus case cannot justify 
its discriminatory actions towards a particular subgroup of 
 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 345. Id. (quoting Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43). 
 346. Id. (quoting Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43). 
 347. See also Myers v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, Inc., 701 N.E.2d 738, 743 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that “[t]he point behind the establishment of the 
sex-plus discrimination theory is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary 
judgment when the defendant employer does not discriminate against all 
members of the sex” (emphasis in original)). 
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women by pointing to its favorable treatment of other women 
not in that subgroup.348 By the same token, an employer 
defending a sexual orientation discrimination claim cannot 
justify its discriminatory treatment of lesbians with evidence 
of how it treats heterosexual women.349 In fact, the opposite 
is true, as a female plaintiff alleging sexual orientation 
discrimination can sometimes benefit by evidence that her 
employer treats heterosexual females more favorably. Such 
evidence, for example, might help a plaintiff like Hively 
expose her employer’s specific animus against homosexual 
females, rather than females on the whole, based on gender 
stereotypes.350 For this reason, courts analyzing sex-plus 
claims have found, for example, that a plaintiff’s age-plus-
gender claim alleging discrimination against older women 
can be proven with evidence of differential treatment 
between the plaintiff and younger women.351 After all, where 
an employer treats both older women and younger women 
with the same discriminatory intent, the plaintiff’s claim 
would be better cast as a pure sex discrimination claim. 
In the final analysis, sex discrimination claims require 
proof that “the employer actually relied on [a plaintiff’s] 
gender in making its decision.”352 What matters most, then, 
is not whether the plaintiff can generate evidence pertaining 
either to an opposite gender comparator or to other women 
 
 348. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971) 
(finding that a policy of refusing to hire women with pre-school age children 
discriminates on the basis of sex even though “75–80% of those hired for the 
position” at issue were women). 
 349. See id. 
 350. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Lori Franchina at 30, Franchina v. City of 
Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (No. 16-2401). 
 351. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cty., Kansas, 96 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1187–88 (D. Kan. 2000) (stating that because “[p]laintiff’s age-
plus-gender claim is based on defendants’ alleged discrimination 
against . . . older women . . . plaintiff must show differential treatment between 
herself and younger women” to prevail). 
 352. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). 
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outside the plaintiff’s subclass, but rather whether the 
plaintiff can show that her gender was “a motivating factor” 
in the employer’s adverse decision, which is all Title VII 
requires.353 For sexual orientation discrimination claims, 
sex-plus theory provides the basis for such a claim.354 
CONCLUSION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex, and well-established sex-
plus precedents make clear that such discrimination can 
occur even when not all male or female employees in a 
defendant’s workforce experience the same discriminatory 
treatment. Although the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits 
have taken the initiative in expanding Title VII’s protections 
to claims of sexual orientation discrimination, the majority 
of federal appellate courts still cling to the idea that sexual 
orientation discrimination is not unlawful. As this Article 
has shown, sex-plus theory destroys that notion, and can 
serve a critical role in bringing uniformity to the nation’s 
laws on this issue. 
 
 
 353. See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53. 
 354. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112–13 (2d Cir. 
2018) (explaining why, in the Second Circuit’s view, “sexual orientation is a 
function of sex”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 346–47 
(7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “a policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual 
orientation . . . is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for someone of 
a given sex,” and that “[a]ny . . . job decision based on the fact that the 
complainant—woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates or 
marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex,” such 
that “it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination”); Baldwin 
v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (July 15, 2015) 
(explaining that sexual orientation discrimination is “sex” discrimination because 
“an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is alleging 
that his or her employer took his or her sex into account by treating him or her 
differently for associating with a person of the same sex”). 
